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“THE ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION” UNDER ARTICLE 82 OF THE TREATY 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property rights2 (“IPRs”) are inherently monopolistic3 as they provide the IPR 
owner with certain exclusive rights, thereby preventing third parties from exercising or 
exploiting those IPRs for a stipulated time period.4 This characteristic may at the outset seem to 
contradict the fundamental premise of competition law that aims to eliminate, or at the very least, 
reduce monopolies and cartels in order to facilitate free trade and healthy competition.5 The 
increasing importance of intellectual property protection in international trade evinced by the 
Preamble6 to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights, 1994 
(“TRIPS”)7 and the augmentation of IPR trade have intensified the tug-of-war between IPRs and 
competition law.8  
The ‘collision’ between IPRs and competition law is also reflected within the European 
Union (“EU”).9 The main objective of the EU10 is to abolish inter-state barriers to free movement 
of goods11 within the common market. This objective has been emphasized by the European 
Court of Justice (“ECJ”) in Establissements Consten SA and Grundig-verkaufs GmbH v. 
Commission.
12 Competition law in the EU ensures a level playing field for businesses in the 
member states and prevents the distortion of free trade within the common internal market. 
[*42*] The Treaty of the European Community (“EC Treaty”) emphasizes the unrestricted 
movement of goods and services and discourages restrictions in competition that have an adverse 
impact on trade between member states.13 While a large body of complex law within the EU 
dealing with competition issues has developed over the years,14 broadly speaking, EU 
competition law is confined to dealing with restrictive agreements and equivalent arrangements 
by and between undertakings, mergers that create or strengthen dominant positions, and abuse of 
dominant positions by undertakings that have a significant anti-competitive impact on trade 
between EU member states.15 Article 81 of the EC Treaty (ex Article 85) outlines provisions that 
prevent restrictive agreements or arrangements between undertakings, decisions by associations 
of undertakings and concerted practices that have an effect of distorting competition within the 
common market. Unlike Article 81, Article 82 (ex Article 86) applies to unilateral actions by 
undertakings. Article 82 prohibits “any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position within the common market or in a substantial part of it … as incompatible with the 
common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States.” To put it succinctly in 
the words of the ECJ, “for the prohibition under Article 86 [now Article 82] to apply it is ... 
necessary that three elements shall be present together: the existence of a dominant position, the 
abuse of this position, and the possibility that trade between member-States may be affected 
thereby.”16 
 
While the EC Treaty predominantly regulates competition law in the common market, the 
individual member states under Article 295 of the EC Treaty regulate IPRs. . Article 295 
provides that “the Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member states governing the 
system of property ownership.” The ECJ has interpreted the term ‘property’ to include [*43*] 
intellectual property17 and therefore Article 295 empowers EU member states to formulate their 
own laws to govern the ownership of IPRs.18 IPRs, like other property rights, are subjective 
rights relating to an object; a work (for copyright), invention (for patent), trademark etc.19 The 
IPR owner has not only the exclusive right to produce and disseminate the work or invention 
protected by the IPR, but also has the exclusive right to assign or license the IPR itself to a third 
person so that the third person may produce and/or disseminate the work or improve upon it. 
Therefore, there is a distinction between the trade in an IPR per se (i.e. copyright or patent right) 
and the products resulting from the exercise of such IPRs (such as a book, movie or an invention) 
(“IPR products”), which must be borne in mind.20 The main policy rationale underlying 
intellectual property protection is to provide the author, owner or inventor an incentive to 
innovate. An IPR is granted as a reward for the effort the person or company has put into the 
work or invention.21 It gives the owner an advantage compared to other competitors.22 At the 
same time, the extent of protection afforded is usually limited in keeping with public interest. 
While the IPR owner has certain exclusive rights, the public also has a right to benefit from those 
IPRs. This is a delicate balance that needs to be ensured and maintained when granting 
intellectual property protection.  
The distribution of competition law and intellectual property law between the EU and the 
individual member states respectively has raised many problems with the European Community. 
The European Commission,23 (“Commission”) the ECJ and its subordinate Court of First 
Instance (“CFI”) have played an active role in enforcing EU competition law24 and time and 
again dealt with the issue of deciding what impact Community competition law has on the 
exercise of IPRs, which are predominantly territorial and national in nature. As previously stated, 
the goal of integrating national economies has greatly influenced the decisions of the above  
[*44*] three institutions in dealing with the debate between competition policies, and exercise of 
and trade in IPRs. 
This paper attempts to delineate the restraint on licensing of IPRs per se within the EU 
with specific reference to Article 82 of the EC Treaty.25   
Part II discusses the judicially carved ‘existence vs. exercise’ doctrine in relation to IPRs 
under the which Courts have held that while member states continue to have the prerogative to 
create IPRs, owners cannot exercise their IPRs in a manner that will frustrate the objectives of 
the common market, such as distort competition thereby affecting trade between member states. I 
argue that this has significantly narrowed the scope of Article 295.  
The third part of this paper, focuses on how the Courts and Commission, in restraining 
the licensing of IPRs, invoked existing principles of competition law under Article 82.  Over the 
past couple of decades, the Courts and Commission decided cases in which IPR owners have 
been accused of abusing their ‘dominant position’ for not licensing their IPRs.26 In these cases, 
the Courts and Commission implicitly applied existing principles of Community law such as the 
doctrines of primacy, direct effect and essential facilities, as well as competition law to prevent 
IPRs from partitioning the common market.27 In the famous Magill case (discussed throughout 
this paper), the ECJ articulated the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test, which was applied to 
determine if an IPR owner has abused its dominant position in refusing to license its IPRs. In the 
Magill case, three television stations broadcasting in Ireland and UK refused to license their 
copyright on the information contained in their program listings to Magill, an Irish publisher. 
Though the stations obtained an injunction in Ireland against Magill from publishing a 
comprehensive TV guide that competed with the broadcaster’s guides, they were unsuccessful 
before the Commission, CFI and ECJ. The three authorities held that the television stations had  
[*45*] abused their dominant position by refusing to license their copyrights in the program 
listings to Magill and thereby violated Article 82 and were ordered to compulsorily license their 
copyrights to Magill for reasonable royalties.  In later decisions, the Court and Commission 
further explored the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test in the context of IPRs. In this section, I 
discuss the restraining impact that Article 82 (that is used to regulate anti-competitive practices) 
has on IPR licensing.  
Part IV discusses the implicit inclusion of the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine in adjudicating 
IPR licensing issues under Article 82, which can be gleaned from an analysis of some of the 
cases. I endorse the view that classifying IPRs as ‘essential facilities’ would undermine their 
very existence.   
I regretfully conclude that the judicially activist approach of the ECJ, in adopting 
different techniques to preclude the partitioning of the common market, has significantly 
undermined the nature of IPRs, which could consequently result in stifling innovation. Though 
the initial hostility towards IPRs has improved over a period of time, the Courts and Commission 
still seem to be prejudiced by the inherently monopolistic effect of IPRs,28 which tends to tilt the 
scales in favor of competition law.  
II. EXISTENCE VS. EXERCISE: THE SUPREMACY OF EU LAW OVER MEMBER 
STATES’ INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
 
For a long period of time, the Commission, CFI and ECJ have treated IPRs in a step-
motherly fashion. The EU was created with the purpose of forming a common market to enable 
goods, services, people and capital to move freely about.29 However, IPRs seemed to be in 
opposition to the fundamental principle of a single market as they provided exclusivity to IPR 
owners and thereby restricted free trade in IPR-products. The ECJ dealt with this difficult matter 
in Establissements Consten SA and Grundig-verkaufs GmbH v. Commission,30 where it drew a 
[*46*] distinction between the grant or existence of a national IPR, which was not subject to the 
provisions of the EC Treaty, and the exercise of an IPR, which fell within the purview of the EC 
Treaty. The ECJ held that Articles 3031 and 295 of the EC Treaty do not oppose every impact of 
Community Law on the exercise of industrial property rights.32 In that case, the Commission 
issued an injunction preventing the parties from using their national law relating to trademarks to 
obstruct parallel imports, without touching the grant of those rights.33 The Court held that this 
action of the Commission was compatible with the character of the Community competition 
system.34 The court also went on to say that a trademark owner could not abuse its trademark 
rights derived under national law to defeat the Community law on restrictive practices.35  
 The existence vs. exercise doctrine seems to be consistent with the doctrines of primacy 
and direct effect. In the landmark case of Costa v. ENEL,36 the ECJ unequivocally asserted the 
‘doctrine of primacy’. It held that unlike other international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created 
its own legal system and the member states have limited their sovereign rights albeit within 
limited fields, and have created a body of law that binds them and their nationals. Therefore, 
unilateral actions taken by individual member states cannot supersede the Community legal 
system, nor can they be inconsistent with that legal system.37 This ruling has proved to be very 
relevant with respect to IPRs.38 Further, in Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastingen,39 the ECJ articulated the fundamental ‘doctrine of direct effect’ whereby provisions 
of the EC Treaty could have direct effect on member states and that individuals could invoke 
them before national courts.40 The ECJ declared that “independent of the legislation of member 
states community law not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer 
on them rights which become part of their legal heritage.”41 The doctrine of direct effect has 
been extended to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.42 [*47*] 
While the Consten case was related to Article 81, its reasoning has nevertheless been 
extrapolated to apply to provisions under Article 82. In Hoffman v. Centrafarm, the Court 
recognized the difference between an existence of an IPR and its exercise, which is limited to 
certain provisions in the EC Treaty. In that case the Court held that “to the extent to which the 
exercise of a trade-mark right is lawful in accordance with the provisions of Article 36 of the 
Treaty, such exercise is not contrary to Article 86 of the Treaty on the sole ground that it is an 
act of an undertaking occupying a dominant position on the market if the trademark right has not 
been used as an instrument for the abuse of such a position.”43 Even in Volvo v. Veng, Advocate 
General M. Jean Mischo highlighted the difference between the grant of an intellectual property 
right and its exercise that could result in an abuse of a dominant position. In fact, the ECJ also 
held that the refusal by an owner of registered designs to license the designs for reasonable 
royalties could in some circumstances involve abuse of dominant position by the owner that was 
liable to affect trade between member states and hence violate Article 82.44 The existence vs. 
exercise doctrine was also endorsed by the ECJ in the Magill case.45 Thus, the ECJ decisions 
clearly indicate the adoption of the existence vs. exercise doctrine while construing whether the 
licensing (or refusal to license) of IPRs violates Article 82.  
 The ECJ has also adopted a ‘subject matter’ test for IPRs. In Deutsche Grammophon v. 
Metro
46 the ECJ held that derogations from the free movement of goods are permitted under 
Article 30 only to the extent to which they are justified for the purpose of safeguarding rights, 
which constitute the specific-matter of such IPRs. Consequently, in each case, the Court has to 
determine the specific subject matter for each type of IPR.47 In Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, the 
ECJ defined the specific subject matter for patents as “the guarantee that the patentee, to reward 
the creative effort of the invention, has the exclusive right to use an invention with a view to  
[*48*] manufacturing industrial products and putting them into circulation for the first time, 
either directly by grant of licenses to third parties, as well as to oppose infringements.”48 The 
ECJ also characterized the specific subject matter of trademarks in Centrafarm v. Winthrop. The 
Court held that the specific subject matter was the “guarantee that the owner of the trademark has 
the exclusive right to use that trademark, for the purpose of putting products protected by 
trademark into circulation for the first time, and is therefore intended to protect him against 
competitors wishing to take advantage of the status and reputation of the trademark by selling 
products illegally bearing that trademark.”49 With respect to copyrights, the ECJ has held the 
specific subject matter as the exclusive right to both performance and reproduction.50 In the 
Volvo case, the ECJ defined the subject matter of a model or design right as “to prevent third 
parties from manufacturing and selling or importing, without its consent, products incorporating 
the design.” 
While the subject matter test was adopted in relation to Article 30 of the EC Treaty, 
Advocate General Claus Gulmann tried to extend this test under Article 82 in the Magill case to 
the issue of refusing to license copyrights per se.51 Gulmann disagreed with the reasoning of the 
CFI that the refusal of the broadcasters to license their copyrights amounted to an abuse of 
dominant position under Article 82.52 He said that since the exclusive right to reproduce a 
copyrighted work forms part of the subject matter of copyright,53 the exclusive right to refuse 
licenses is a corollary of the reproduction right, and ‘accordingly the right to refuse licenses 
forms part of the specific subject matter of copyright.’54  He opined that only when the exercise 
of an IPR is not necessary to fulfill its essential function that the interest of free competition must 
prevail over the interest of the owner of the right to engage in that exercise.55 According to him, 
the refusal to license in the Magill case was in order to fulfill the essential function of copyrights, 
[*49*] and therefore not in violation of Article 82.56 Unfortunately, the ECJ declined to accept 
his opinion and went with the CFI’s determination of the issue.57 The ECJ also seemed to 
artificially distinguish between the core subject matter of an IPR and the ability to exercise the 
right in derivative markets.58  
By drawing a ‘metaphysical distinction’ between the existence of IPRs (including their 
core subject matter) and exercise of IPRs (including licensing or refusal to license IPRs), the ECJ 
has armed itself with the power to determine that certain acts relating to the exercise of IPRs 
violate Article 82 of the EC Treaty.59 One author has remarked that, “Article 295 was effectively 
rendered a nullity in relation to intellectual property rights.”60 While the ECJ has not completely 
nullified the existence of Article 295, its judicially active attitude has nevertheless significantly 
limited its scope.  
III. RESTRAINTS ON LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL  
PROPERTY RIGHTS BY THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 82 
 
Undertakings that own IPRs may occupy a dominant position with respect to the IPR or 
IPR products market because of the exclusive rights granted to the IPR owner with respect to 
those rights. The nature of the IPR is relevant to determine dominant position. For instance, in 
case of copyrights, the right is usually co-existent with the copyright work (book, movie, 
software etc.) and therefore the existence of a right may be a key indicator of dominance in a 
relevant product market.61 In case of a patent right, if the patent is only a minor element of the 
product, it is less likely to indicate dominance.62 Similarly, a trademark may not have any direct 
relationship to a particular product market.63 However, if the product is based on the patent, the 
patent right could indicate a dominant position. If these IPRs are used in a manner that disrupts 
free trade within the common market, or tilts the level playing field in favor of the undertaking, 
there is a danger that the undertakings are in violation of Article 82. The Commission, CFI and 
[*50*] ECJ have indirectly controlled the licensing (or refusal thereof) of IPRs by ensuring that 
these acts do not violate Article 82 of the EC Treaty.64 
Licensing of IPRs is only a subset of the activities that Article 82 aims at regulating, 
therefore most of the community and competition law principles generally applicable to 
restrictive practices under Article 82 have also been applied to issues concerning licensing of 
IPRs. However, the Courts have attempted to give some deference to IPRs so as to not 
unnecessarily restrain their exercise and render their existence meaningless, the deference seems 
to be insubstantial, as the scope of Article 295 has been considerably narrowed.65 
In order to understand the implications of Article 82 on licensing of IPRs, I have divided 
this section into five parts: 
(1) Who do these provisions apply to? 
(2) What constitutes the relevant ‘market’? 
(3) When is an undertaking in a ‘dominant position’? 
(4) Under what circumstances is the undertaking said to abuse its dominant position? 
(5) What does ‘effect on trade between member states’ imply? 
Under each of the sub-headings in this part, there is a brief description of general 
competition law principles under Article 82 and thereafter a discussion of the impact they have 
on licensing of IPRs. In the analysis, I have used non-IPR cases at times to explain the basic 
competition principles and then explained how these principles could be and have been applied 
in IPR cases.   [*51*] 
 
1. Who Do These Provisions Apply To? 
 Article 82 applies to acts of ‘undertakings’.66 The term ‘undertaking’ is a broad concept, 
that “covers a collection of resources to carry out economic activities.”67 The term ‘undertaking’ 
can therefore encompass a wide variety of legal entities including sole proprietary firms, 
partnerships, companies, corporations, associations and governmental as well as non-
governmental organizations. Thus, any undertaking that owns IPRs and wants to trade in them 
would be regulated by this provision.  
The language in Articles 81 and 82 do not in any way assert jurisdiction over commerce 
with ‘foreign nations’.68 While the right of a State to regulate acts carried out abroad is a matter 
of public international law, it seems unclear as to what extent the EU (which is not a State) can 
regulate acts of foreign undertakings when they affect trade between member states of the EU.69 
Nevertheless, the Commission and the ECJ have interpreted competition law provisions to have 
an extraterritorial effect under certain circumstances. The ECJ has implicitly extended the 
meaning of undertakings to include foreign entities i.e. undertakings not established in the EU 
territory. 70    
 The ECJ’s leading case on extraterritoriality is the Wood Pulp case71 decision of 1988. In 
that case, the Commission sued non-EU producers of wood pulp for various restrictive practices 
alleged to have restrained trade within the common market.72 The ECJ held that the jurisdiction 
of EU law existed over firms outside the Community if they ‘implemented’ a price-fixing 
agreement that reached outside the Community by selling to purchasers within the Community.73 
The Court held that it was immaterial whether or not the defendants had any recourse to 
subsidiaries, agents, sub-agents or branches within the Community, in order to make their 
contacts with purchasers within the Community.74 Accordingly, the Community’s jurisdiction to 
apply its competition rules to such conduct was covered by the territoriality principle, [*52*] as 
universally recognized by public international law.75 A broad interpretation of this decision 
suggests that any practice which produces an effect on competition within the Community may 
be regarded as having been implemented in the Community and therefore falling within the 
scope of the EC Treaty.76 This decision of the ECJ has raised much controversy and it could even 
lead to conflicts of jurisdiction with non-EU countries.77 
 Non-EU IPR owners may be adversely affected by such extra-territorial application of 
EU competition law. A foreign undertaking that wants to license its IPRs within the EU, directly 
or through a subsidiary or agent, or refuses to license the IPRs would have to ensure that in doing 
so it does not abuse its dominant position in the EU, if any, so as to distort competition within 
the EU common market.  
2. What Constitutes the Relevant ‘Market’? 
In order to determine the dominance of an undertaking and the abuse of this dominance, 
it is essential to establish whether the market is in fact the ‘relevant market’.78 Defining the scope 
of the ‘relevant market’ in which the undertaking conducts its trade is crucial as it determines 
whether the undertaking is dominant or not.79 Defining the market helps the Commission and 
Courts in identifying the competitors, thereby determining whether the acts of the ‘dominant 
undertaking’ have any anti-competitive effects on those competitors. If the market is defined 
broadly, an undertaking is less likely to be in a dominant position amongst all the competitors 
than if the market is defined in sufficiently narrow terms, which can limit the field of legitimate 
exploitation of IPRs. “A narrowly defined market can produce the result that possession of an 
intellectual property right can coincide with or contribute to a position of dominance on a market 
by reducing the possibilities of substitution. This then places the intellectual property owner into 
a regulated category under Article 86 (now Article 82).”80 [*53*] 
The first step is to determine the relevant product market81 upon which dominance is 
measured, and its geographical scope.82 In order to guide the Commission and the Courts in 
effective application of competition policies in the EU, the Commission issued the ‘Commission 
Comment [ZM1]: They don't repeat 
each other because the first one talks 
about the relevant market, whereas the 
second one talks about "scope" of the 
relevant market.  
Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law’83 
(“Notice on Relevant Market”). The ECJ and CFI have also in several instances offered some 
guiding principles on defining the ‘relevant market’. I have briefly discussed the meaning of 
‘product market’ and ‘geographic market’ and their relevance in intellectual property licensing 
cases.    
(a)  Product Market 
 The term ‘product’ and ‘product market’ may not always refer to the same thing. While 
determination of the product market commences with the product, it often exceeds the confines 
of the product and includes a range of other goods.84   
 In the Notice on Relevant Market, the Commission defined a relevant product market as 
one that “comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or 
substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products’ characteristics, their prices and their 
intended use.”85 Further, in Tierce Ladbroke SA v. E.C. Commission86 involving an issue 
concerning licensing of copyrights, the CFI, relying on prior precedents, expounded on the 
meaning of ‘relevant product market.’ It held that: 
For the purposes of Article 86 E.C., the relevant product or service market 
includes products or services which are substitutable or sufficiently 
interchangeable with the product or service in question, not only in terms of their 
objective characteristics by virtue of which they are particularly suitable for 
satisfying the constant needs of consumers, but also in terms of the conditions of 
competition and/or structure of supply and demand of the market in question.87 
Thus, substitutability or interchangeability88 of the products plays a significant role in 
determining whether two or more products are part of the same product market. [*54*] However, 
this gives substantial leeway to the Commission and the Courts to flex the meaning of ‘product 
market’ based on the facts of each case. For instance, in Hugin v. Commission,89 the ECJ adopted 
a narrow definition of product market and stated that a spare part of a product could constitute a 
market that was separate from the main product itself. The ECJ’s main reason for finding Hugin 
in a dominant position in a separate market for the spare parts was that there was special demand 
for the spare parts.90 Similarly in Hilti v. European Commission,91 the ECJ accepted a relatively 
narrow definition of product market as proposed by the Commission. In that case the 
Commission claimed that each part of a particular package (consisting of patented gun and 
cartridge strips, and un-patented nails) constituted a separate market, and there was not one 
single market for the complex product. Consequently, Hilti, which was using its patented 
cartridges to tie in nails, was found to abuse the dominant position in the market of a particular 
part of the entire package.92  
 The finding of a narrow product market can thus tremendously restrict the ability of IPR 
owners to exploit their rights93 and ultimately result in a lose-lose situation for the IPR owner. 
For instance, in the Magill case, the CFI found two different product markets: the market for TV 
listings themselves, and the derivative market for the TV listing magazines.94 The CFI and ECJ 
held that the TV stations by force of circumstance had a de facto monopoly over the information 
(listings) and therefore occupied a dominant position over the derivative market (of TV listing 
magazines).95 As Steven Anderman puts it, the IPR owner could face ‘a form of double 
jeopardy’.96  
(b) Geographic Market 
The ECJ in United Brands v. Commission held: 
The conditions for the application of Article 86 to an undertaking in a dominant 
position presuppose the clear delimitation of the substantial part of the Common  
[*55*] Market in which it may be able to engage in abuses which hinder effective 
competition and this is an area where the objective conditions of competition 
applying to the product in question must be the same for all traders.
97  
 
Further, paragraph 8 of the Notice on Relevant Market defines relevant geographic 
market as follows: 
The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the undertakings 
concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products or services in which 
the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogenous and which can be 
distinguished from neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are 
appreciably different in those areas. 
 
From the above two quotations it is clear that while determining the geographic market 
the following factors must be considered:  
(i)  the undertakings must be engaged in business in that area;  
(ii)  the conditions of business must be homogenous for all competitors; and  
(iii)  that area should be distinguishable from other areas where the competition conditions are 
different. 
beyond its judicial parameters.98 At this point in time, the Courts and Commission are walking a 
very thin line between competition law and intellectual property protection, and more often than 
not seem to step over on the side of competition law. Though the initial hostility towards IPRs as 
being contrary to the fundamental principle of a single European market has decreased and the 
Courts have given some deference to the existence and exercise of IPRs over the years, a more 
objective and unambiguous standard is desired. 
In the Ladbroke case, the CFI held that where the relevant product market does not 
constitute an independent market, but is instead an ancillary market created as a result of and 
operating according to the conditions of the main market, the geographical scope of the ancillary 
market may be defined by reference to that of the main market.99 Therefore, as in the Magill case 
that recognized a derivative market for copyrights, the geographical scope of the derivative 
market can be determined from looking at the geographic market for copyrights. [*56*] 
Further, according to Steven Anderman, when dealing with IPRs the geographic market 
is often shaped to fit the area of intellectual property protection (i.e. the region in which the 
exclusivity is conferred) without any further analysis of the interpretation of trade.100 This is 
usually confined to one Member State or two, as it was in the Magill case.101 He has criticized 
the act of the Commission in determining the relevant geographic market as less of an objective 
economic assessment of homogenous market conditions and more an administrative device for 
establishing findings of dominance and abuse.102  
 
3. When  Is an Undertaking in a “Dominant Position”? 
(a) Meaning of “dominant position” 
 After having determined the relevant market in which the undertaking operates, 
the next step is to determine whether the undertaking occupies a “dominant position” in that 
market.  In Michelin v. Commission, the ECJ confirmed that “Article 86 prohibits any abuse by 
an undertaking of a dominant position . . .  that is to say any abuse of a position of economic 
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to hinder the maintenance of effective 
competition on the relevant market by allowing it to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors and customers and ultimately of consumers.”103 In Hoffman La 
Roche, the ECJ also indicated that the definition of dominance does not apply solely to 
monopolies: 
Such a position does not preclude some competitors . . . but enables the 
undertaking which profits by it, if not to determine, at least to have an  [*57*] 
appreciable influence on the conditions under which that competition will 
develop, and to any case to act largely in disregard of it so long as such conduct 
does not operate to its detriment.104  
Furthermore, a trader can only be in a dominant position on the market for a product if he 
has succeeded in winning a large part of that market.105  The percentage of the market owned or 
controlled necessary to constitute a dominant position is not static.  Rather, it is dependent upon 
a number of factors including the relevant market and the percentage of market share relative to 
other competitors.106 The ECJ has found a dominant position in cases ranging from ninety 
percent market share,107 to only a forty to forty-five percent market share.108  In addition, the 
Commission has issued a report indicating that market shares of twenty to forty percent cannot 
be ruled out as being dominant.109  Furthermore, it has also been suggested that even if the 
market share is lower, a dominant position may be inferred if there are high barriers to entry that 
guard the market share.110  
(b) Dominant position vis-à-vis IPRs 
In the Magill case, the ECJ categorically held, “[S]o far as dominant position is 
concerned, it is to be remembered at the outset that mere ownership of an intellectual property 
right cannot confer such a position.”
111  The Court was merely re-iterating the law that it had 
propounded in its prior decisions.  
In the Sirena112 and Deutsche Grammophon113 cases, the court held that for the proprietor 
of an industrial property right to hold a dominant position, he must be in a position to prevent the 
maintenance of effective competition over a considerable part of the relevant market.  The court 
must take into consideration the existence and position of any producers or distributors who may 
be marketing similar goods or goods which may be substituted for them.114 [*58*] 
In Hoffman v. Centrafarm, the court recognized the difference between an existence of an 
IPR and its exercise which is limited to certain provisions in the EC Treaty. In that case the court 
held that “to the extent to which the exercise of a trademark right is lawful in accordance with 
the provisions of Article 36 of the Treaty, such exercise is not contrary to Article 86 of the Treaty 
on the sole ground that it is an act of an undertaking occupying a dominant position on the 
market if the trademark right has not been used as an instrument for the abuse of such a 
position.”115  Thus, the court clearly indicates a difference between the existence of a dominant 
position (which does not violate Article 82) and its abuse (which does). 
Even in the Volvo case, the Advocate General opined:  
The proprietorship of a registered design is not of itself sufficient automatically to 
create a dominant position in every case. A fortiori, it cannot per se amount to an 
abuse of such position…. As soon as the proprietor exercises the rights deriving 
from his registered design and substitutable parts can no longer be produced, there 
is no doubt that the manufacturer holds a dominant position in the relevant market 
in the spare parts for which he registered the design.116  
The Advocate General’s opinion could be interpreted as stating that both the existence of an IPR 
and its exercise may not amount to the undertaking holding a dominant position, unless the 
undertaking effectively prevents competitors from making ”substitutable” products available to 
consumers.  [*59*] 
 
4. Under What Circumstances Is the Undertaking Said to Abuse Its Position? 
 We have seen above that the mere fact that an undertaking enjoys a dominant position in 
the relevant market does not amount to a violation of Article 82.  In order for Article 82 to be 
violated, the undertaking must “abuse” that position.  
(a) Meaning of “Abuse” 
In Hoffman v. Commission, the ECJ enunciated on the concept of “abuse”. It held that  
[T]he concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behavior of an 
undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of a 
market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the 
degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods 
different from those which condition normal competition in products or services 
on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of 
hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market 
or the growth of that competition.117 
 An undertaking can be said to abuse its dominant position if it acts in a fashion that 
encumbers the preservation or growth of competition in the relevant market.  For example, 
offering of discounts or financial advantages to customers that tends to prevent them from 
obtaining the products from competitors could amount to an abuse of dominant position under 
Article 82.118 
(b) Abuse in Relation to IPRs 
The main rule enunciated by the court in the Volvo case, and further expounded in the 
Magill case, is that the mere exercise of IPRs (i.e., license or refusal to license) does not amount 
to an abuse of the dominant position.  In the Volvo case, the UK Patents Court [*60*] made a 
preliminary reference119 to the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling on, inter alia, whether the refusal 
to license the IPRs amounted to an abuse of the dominant position.  The ECJ decided as follows: 
[T]he exercise of an exclusive right by the proprietor of a registered design in 
respect of car body panels may be prohibited by Article 86 [now Article 82] if it 
involves, on the part of an undertaking holding a dominant position, certain 
abusive conduct such as the arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts to independent 
repairers, the fixing of prices for spare parts at unfair level, or decision no longer 
to produce spare parts for a particular model even though many cars of that model 
are still in circulation, provided that such conduct is liable to affect trade between 
member states.120 
In the Magill case, the ECJ expanded on Volvo and held that it is the normal exercise of 
an IPR owner’s right to freely determine the conditions under which he markets his product,121 
and a refusal to grant a license, even if it is the act of an undertaking holding a dominant 
position, cannot in itself constitute abuse of a dominant position.122 However, the exercise of an 
exclusive right by the proprietor of an intellectual property right may in “exceptional 
circumstances” involve abusive conduct.123 The Magill court laid down the following as 
“exceptional circumstances”: 124  
(i) No actual or potential substitute for a particular product for which there was specific, 
constant, and regular potential demand on the part of the consumers: Prevention of the 
appearance of a new product on the market because of the reliance on intellectual 
property rights, which the appellants did not offer and for which there was potential 
consumer demand; 
(ii) No justification for the refusal to license / supply; [*61*] 
(iii) Reservation of a secondary market by excluding all competition on that market by 
denying basic raw material indispensable for the product. 
(c) Deciphering the Restraints of the “Exceptional Circumstances” Test in 
Magill 
 
 The Magill court found all three circumstances present.  Magill wanted to publish a 
comprehensive weekly television guide, but was prevented from doing so by the three television 
stations that owned the copyright in their program information (i.e., the raw material).  There 
was no actual or potential substitute for a weekly television guide despite constant consumer 
demand.  In that respect, by refusing to license the copyright in the raw material, the television 
stations had prevented the emergence of a new product.  Furthermore, the court held that there 
was no business justification for the refusal, although the ECJ did not discuss this finding 
thoroughly.125  Lastly, the court held that the television stations had reserved the monopoly in the 
secondary market of weekly television guides by excluding all competition. 
 Cumulative application of the circumstances: After doing a post-mortem analysis of the 
Magill decision, it is evident that the court did not specify whether all three exceptional 
circumstances must be present to find an abuse of dominant position. One author, Rosa Greaves, 
has suggested that the minimum requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to claim that an 
IPR owner has abused its dominant position are that the owner must be the sole source of the raw 
material and that access to the material is indispensable for the other party.126  This implies that 
only the third condition is necessary to find abuse of the dominant position.  However, on the 
other hand, two authors, Hedvig Schmidt127 and Valentine Korah,128 have remarked that all three 
conditions must be present together to find an abuse.  
 The CFI distinguished the Magill case while making its decision in the Ladbroke case. 
The court held that the applicant, Ladbroke, was not prevented from entering into a new [*62*] 
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market because, not only was it present in the market, but it occupied a large share.129  
Furthermore, according to the court, the IPR owners had a reasonable justification for refusing to 
license the copyrights because they were not present on the Belgian market, therefore, the refusal 
did not amount to an abusive exploitation of the rights in the Belgian market.130  As mentioned 
earlier, the court held that the refusal to license would fall under Article 82 if it concerned an 
article that was essential or if there was no real or potential substitute, or if a new product was 
being prevented despite consumer demand.131  Even though the CFI held that the Magill decision 
was not relevant to the case,132 it seemed to have analyzed the circumstances cumulatively.133  
 In Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint,134 the ECJ interpreted Magill to mean that all the 
exceptional circumstances must be present to find an abuse under Article 82.135  In that case, 
Mediaprint was a publisher of two daily newspapers and operated the only national home 
delivery service in Austria.  Bronner claimed that Mediaprint held a dominant position in relation 
to that service and should be required to deliver Bronner’s papers too.  The court disagreed with 
Bronner’s arguments.  It held as follows:   
 [F]or the Magill judgment to be effectively relied upon in order to plead the 
existence of an abuse within the meaning  of Article 86 of the Treaty . . . not only 
that the refusal of the service comprised in home delivery be likely to eliminate all 
competition in the daily newspaper market on the part of the person requesting the 
service and that such refusal be incapable of being objectively justified, but also 
that the service in itself be indispensable to carrying on that person’s business, in 
as much as there is no actual or potential substitute in existence for that home 
delivery service.136  
The ECJ ruled that there were other ways of delivering newspapers even if they were less 
satisfactory or not economically viable for Bronner.137  Furthermore, there [*63*] were no 
technical, legal, or economic obstacles that appeared to make it unreasonably difficult for a 
publisher to set up a second national delivery service.138  
 However, in NDC v. IMS,139 the CFI noted that the Commission, in its interim decision, 
seemed to take a non-cumulative interpretation of the conditions regarded as constituting 
“exceptional circumstances” in Magill.140  The CFI observed that the Commission asserted that 
the exercise of a copyright may amount to an abuse even in the absence of abusive additional 
conduct when, inter alia, it prevents the appearance off a new product.  The CFI remarked that 
although the Commission’s interpretation “may be correct,” based on prior cases is reasonable 
grounds to conclude that the “exceptional circumstances” envisaged in Magill are concurrent.141  
While the ECJ upheld the CFI’s decision to suspend the Commission’s decision, it did not 
specifically comment on the CFI’s determination on the application of “exceptional 
circumstances.”  It would be useful to keep track of the final decision of the Commission in this 
case to understand how the Commission interprets and implements the Magill “exceptional 
circumstances” test in its final decision.  
Undefined scope of the circumstances: Furthermore, given the backdrop of Magill, and 
the manner in which later courts have dealt with the refusal to license IPRs, it is still not 
completely clear as to when an IPR owner’s refusal to license the IPRs would violate 
competition law.  For example, would a patent holder’s refusal to license the patent to a third 
party that wants to manufacture a new (competing) product violate Article 82?  What 
circumstances would qualify as a justification for refusal to supply or license IPRs?  Many 
copyright holders fear that EC competition laws will be used force them to license billions of  
[*64*] dollars worth of technology or proprietary information in critically competitive areas.142  
An IPR owner, by virtue of his exclusive rights, has the authority to enjoin a person from 
exploiting his IPRs, or, for that matter, refuse to license the IPRs to a third person.  However, if 
such a refusal by itself were said to violate competition law, it would negate the rights of an IPR 
owner and allow competitors to free ride on the goodwill and investment of the IPR owner.143  
Another rather unfortunate consequence of Magill seems to be that the market demand 
for a new product would limit the rights of an IPR owner. In Magill, the customers already had 
access to the different television listings, but in different places.  The only difference that Magill 
sought to make was to combine all the listings into one television guide.  The court seemed to 
have favored the convenience sought by the customers in accessing the listings from one place 
over the significant interests of the IPR owners.144  While it is true that market demand drives 
innovation and production of new products, it could also stifle innovation if undertakings that 
have invested substantial time, effort, and money are forced to license their rights in creative 
works to “free-riders” in order to satiate the market demand.  As stated by Advocate General 
Gulmann, the interests of the consumer should not be used to justify interference in the specific 
subject matter of a copyright.145   
In order to balance the interests of the author/inventor with those of the public (including 
competitors and consumers), the TRIPS agreement allows member states to create exceptions 
and limitations to the rights of IPR owners.146  Member states may, in the interest of the public, 
allow compulsory licensing of IPRs in some instances.  Given that these restrictions already exist 
on IPR owners, imposing further restrictions on the exclusive rights of IPR owners under the 
garb of competition law seems unjustified.147 [*65*] 
Furthermore, “no justification for refusal to supply/license IPRs” is only one of the three 
factors in the “exceptional circumstances” test.  However, the other two factors, consumer 
demand for new product due to lack of substitutes and the IPR constituting raw material for 
another product, seem to qualify, at least to some extent, the “no justification” factor.  This factor 
says that if there exists consumer demand for a new product, and if the IPR is the raw material 
required for the new product, a refusal to license the IPR would not be justified.  It is therefore 
only fair to the IPR owner that all three circumstances exist together in order to find an abuse of 
dominant position.  Determining abuse based on the existence of only one of the three factors 
may be detrimental to the interests of IPR owners and against the concept of intellectual property 
protection.  
It is necessary that the ECJ properly explain the scope and application of the “exceptional 
circumstances” test in relation to intellectual property licensing issues to ensure more stability.  
One author has suggested that the best way to summarize the Magill judgment could be to say 
that the refusal to license IPRs is contrary to Art. 82 if it is “combined with or is the means of 
committing abusive conduct that has effects other than those which would be caused; in the 
market primarily protected by the intellectual property right, by the mere refusal itself.”148  
However, this seems to be an ambiguous and difficult standard to determine because the 
Commission or court would first have to ascertain the effect that a mere refusal to license would 
have on the market, followed by the effect that the refusal coupled with the “abusive conduct” 
has.  There is definitely a need for a more objective approach to create legal certainty on this 
issue. [*66*] 
(d) Other Forms of Abuse 
 Article 82 also lists four circumstances in which an IPR owner’s conduct could constitute 
an abuse of his dominant position.149  By imposing unfair trading conditions; discriminating 
between trading parties; mandating tie-in arrangements; or limiting production, markets, or 
technical development to the prejudice of consumers, an IPR owner could also adversely affect 
the competition in the market.  For instance, in one case,150 the ECJ held that a national copyright 
management society had abused its dominant position in a substantial part of the common market 
by imposing unfair trading conditions where the royalties which it charged to discotheques were, 
without objective justification, appreciably higher than those charged in other member states, the 
rates being compared on a consistent basis.151  
5. What does “effect on trade between Member States” signify? 
 Another important condition that needs to be satisfied is that the abuse of the 
dominant position resulting from the licensing or refusal to license IPRs must have an effect on 
trade between member states.  If this condition is not satisfied, then, even if an undertaking is 
found to abuse its dominant position, it will not amount to a violation of Article 82.  The 
condition that trade between member states must be affected is a question of law and, as such, 
subject to review by the ECJ.152In Michelin v. Commission, the ECJ concluded:  
[W]hen the holder of a dominant position obstructs access to the market by 
competitors it makes no difference whether such conduct is confined to a single 
Member State so long as it is capable of affecting patterns of trade and 
competition on the Common Market . . . It must also be remembered that Article 
86 does not require it to be proved that the abusive conduct has in fact appreciably 
affected trade between Member-States but that is capable of having that effect.153 
[*67*] 
 The court in the Magill case also upheld the notion that the alleged abusive conduct can 
be anticompetitive if it has the potential of effecting trade between member states.154 In that case, 
the ECJ upheld the CFI’s finding that the applicant had excluded all potential competitors on the 
geographical market consisting of one member state, Ireland, and part of another member state, 
Northern Ireland, and had thus modified the structure of competition on that market, thereby 
affecting potential commercial exchanges between Ireland and the UK.  The ECJ held that “from 
this the CFI drew the proper conclusion that the condition that trade between member states must 
be affected had been satisfied.”155  
IV.   TREATING IPRS AS ESSENTIAL FACILITIES 
 In some of their decisions, discussed hereinafter, the Commission and courts have 
implicitly treated IPRs as essential facilities and thereby diminished the exclusivity provided to 
an IPR owner.  EU law does not provide a legal definition for the essential facilities doctrine.156  
The essential facilities doctrine refers to a situation in which a dominant undertaking owns or 
controls a facility that is indispensable to its competitors and it refuses to grant its competitors 
access to such a facility.157  The burden of proof is on the plaintiff who wants to invoke the 
doctrine to show that the access to the facility is vital to compete in the market with the 
undertaking that owns or controls the essential facility.158  The ECJ seems to have applied the 
essential facilities doctrine under Article 82 in cases where the defendant’s conduct is 
exclusionary, namely, in cases where the refusal to grant access to facilities harms 
competition.159  Although the ECJ has yet to make an explicit reference to the essential facilities 
doctrine in Article 82 cases, it has implicitly used the doctrine in a number of cases.160 
 The Magill decision by the ECJ in 1995 spawned a debate as to whether a refusal to 
license IPRs could implicate the essential facilities doctrine.  As discussed above, the ECJ held  
[*68*] that under “exceptional circumstances,” the refusal by an undertaking to license its IPRs 
to third parties could violate Article 82.  This decision generated a lot of anxiety amongst IPR 
owners in the pharmaceutical and software industries as the owners were unsure whether they 
would be forced to license their IPRs to third parties and competitors.161  Although ECJ has not 
explicitly referred to IPRs as “essential facilities,” in this case it is unclear whether it intended to 
do so.162  
 The scope of the Magill decision has been restricted by the CFI in the Ladbroke case163  
In that case an undertaking holding the exclusive rights (i.e., copyrights) to market televised 
pictures and audio commentaries on French horse races refused to license the copyright to 
retransmit these audiovisuals to a Belgian betting agency.  The CFI distinguished the case from 
Magill and held that the refusal to supply could not fall within the prohibition laid down by 
Article 82 unless it concerned a product or service that was essential for the exercise of the 
activity.  The court held that in that particular case the granting of a license to retransmit the 
horse races was not essential or indispensable to the activities of the betting agency as the bets 
were already placed before the races were transmitted.   
 The decisions in Magill and Ladbroke indicate that whether a refusal to license an IPR 
violates Article 82 depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.  However, as indicated 
above, they do not suggest what can be accepted as a reasonable justification for refusing to 
grant a license for an IPR.164  They could probably also be interpreted to indicate that if the 
refusal to license the IPR is essential to the exercise of an activity, it may violate Article 82.  In 
Magill, the court found that the refusal to license the copyright in the information prevented the 
publisher from publishing a comprehensive television guide, whereas in Ladbroke, the court 
found that the refusal to license the copyright in the audiovisual works was not essential to the  
[*69*] betting activity.  It could thus be implied that while the court did not specifically rely on 
the essential facilities doctrine in either of the cases, the doctrine did have some bearing on the 
court’s decision-making process in the two cases.  
In a later case concerning the grant of exclusive broadcasting rights for football games, 
the Commission threatened to impose fines on the parties if they refused to grant the football 
broadcasting rights to other competitors.165  It has been remarked that the outcome of this case 
probably indicates that the Commission may rely on the essential facilities doctrine in licensing 
cases, particularly those relating to broadcasting rights.166  
The Commission also seemed to apply the essential facilities doctrine in NDC v. IMS.167 
In that case, IMS owned the copyright in a brick-system that it had developed to gather 
information on sales and prescription of pharmaceutical products in Germany and it provided 
this data to pharmaceutical companies.  NDC and AsyX were new entrants in this market and 
they used the brick-system until they were successfully sued by IMS for copyright infringement. 
NDC filed an action with the Commission against IMS for violation of Article 82. In its interim 
decision, the Commission required IMS to grant a license to NDC until it was notified of the 
Commission’s final decision.  The Commission based its decision, inter alia, on the basis that the 
brick-system constituted a de facto industry standard and the refusal of access to the brick-
system was likely to eliminate all competition in the relevant market.168  The President of the 
CFI, ex parte, suspended the interim decision of the Commission until the order terminating the 
proceedings for interim relief was made.169  NDC appealed this decision of the President.  The 
ECJ170 upheld the first decision of the CFI to suspend the Commission’s contested order until the 
main action was reviewed.  The CFI’s decision suggests a more positive attitude towards the 
protection of IPRs.  While balancing the interests of IMS and NDC, the court states that the fact  
[*70*] that IMS “invoked and sought to enforce its copyright . . . for economic reasons does not 
lessen its entitlement to rely on the exclusive right granted by national law for the very purpose 
of regarding innovation.”171  The final decision of the Commission in this case would definitely 
shed more light on whether it feels that IPRs can be treated as essential facilities.  
 Treating IPRs as “essential facilities” could dilute their very existence and would be 
potentially damaging to the viability of IPRs.172  Firstly, it would stifle creativity, not only 
amongst the authors and inventors, but also amongst competitors.  Competitors would be 
disinterested in developing any competing IPRs, but would rather use the existing IPRs under the 
guise of essential facilities.  Ultimately, the consumer will bear the brunt of this phenomenon as 
his/her choice or products would be confined to existing products.  Secondly, creators and 
inventors would also be discouraged from making innovations in existing IPRs due to the fear 
that competitors would appropriate their investment in research and development without any 
adequate quid pro quo.  Lastly, treating IPRs as essential facilities would invite regulatory 
intervention with respect to licensing of IPRs and deprive the IPR owners of their prerogative to 
choose as to when and how they wish to exploit their IPRs.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
While intellectual property protection offers authors and inventors incentives to create by 
rewarding their intellectual efforts, if they are given unrestrained protection, IPR owners would 
be more prone to misusing and manipulating their rights and thereby harming consumer and 
competitor interests.  This tension between IPRs and competition law is reflected in TRIPS.  
Though TRIPS is a fundamental global instrument that concerns the international protection of 
IPRs so as to prevent any barriers in global trade, it also explicitly recognizes that some licensing  
[*71*] practices or conditions pertaining to IPRs may restrain competition and as a result have 
adverse effects on trade.173  In fact, TRIPS permits its members to adopt appropriate measures to 
prevent or control any such licensing practices or conditions that may constitute an abuse of IPRs 
in certain instances and therefore have an unfavorable impact on competition in the relevant 
market.174  Nevertheless, TRIPS clearly articulates that the measures taken to prevent anti-
competitive practices must not be overly intrusive i.e. they should be consistent with other 
provisions of TRIPS that aim at protecting IPRs.175  This seems to indicate that both intellectual 
property and competition law interests must be balanced and neither one of them should trump 
over the other.  However, the EU has nonetheless urged that the exercise of IPRs should be fully 
subject to competition laws.176 
The ECJ has been at the forefront of the European integration movement and has 
deepened and expanded the original Community principles to maintain the effectiveness of EC 
law.177  It is unquestionable that the courts and Commission178 view competition law as a means 
of regulating the exploitation of IPRs (which is a matter that is supposed to be in the exclusive 
domain of member states) in the EU so as prevent the partitioning of the common market. The 
use of the exercise/existence doctrine has significantly narrowed the reach of Article 295.  
Furthermore, the Magill, Ladbroke, and IMS Health cases also suggest an indirect endorsement 
of the essential facilities doctrine in relation to IPRs.  While the ECJ has not explicitly referred to 
the essential facilities doctrine in a case involving the abuse of dominant position by an IPR 
owner under Article 82, the application of this doctrine to IPRs, as suggested above, could 
undermine the very existence of IPRs.  
  The ECJ has often been criticized as being activist and interpreting treaty provisions 
beyond its judicial parameters.179  At this point in time, the courts and Commission are walking a 
[*72*] very thin line between competition law and intellectual property protection, and more 
often than not seem to step over on the side of competition law.  Though the initial hostility 
towards IPRs as being contrary to the fundamental principle of a single European market has 
decreased and the courts have given some deference to the existence and exercise of IPRs over 
the years, a more objective and unambiguous standard is desired. 
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